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Abstract 
The objective of this paper is to provide a critical review of the most popular and often implemented methodologies related to 
Usage-based motor insurance (UBI). UBI schemes, like Pay-as-you-drive (PAUD) and Pay-how-you-drive (PHUD), are a new 
innovative concept that has recently started to be commercialized around the world. The main idea is that instead of a fixed price, 
drivers have to pay a premium based on their driving behaviour and degree of exposure. Despite the fact that it has been 
implemented only for a few years, it is proven to be a very promising practice with a significant potential impact on traffic safety. 
This is achieved by the financial incentive given to drivers in order to improve their driving behaviour such as reducing the 
number of harsh braking and acceleration events taking place or reducing their degree of exposure such as their annual mileage, 
the time of the day travelling etc. and therefore reduces traffic risk. It can also be beneficial towards other social objectives such 
as traffic congestion and pollution emissions reduction. 
To this end, the existing literature on UBI schemes is critically reviewed and research gaps are identified. Findings show that 
there is a multiplicity and diversity of several research studies accumulated in modern literature examining the correlation 
between PAUD (based on driver’s exposure) and PHUD (based on driving behaviour) schemes and traffic risk in order to 
determine accident risk. Moreover, it seems that UBI implementation would eliminate the cross-subsidies phenomenon, which 
implies less insurance costs for goods and less exposed drivers. Moreover, it would also provide a strong motivation for drivers 
to improve their driving behaviour and reduce their degree of exposure by receiving feedback and monitoring their driving 
performance and exposure which would result in traffic risk reduction both totally and individually. 
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1. Introduction 
Current pricing policy of motor insurance companies around the world which is to charge a lump sum for each 
user is unfair and inefficient (Butler et al. 1988). Drivers with similar characteristics such as age, gender, location, 
accident record etc. pay approximately the same premiums no matter if they drive five or fifty thousand kilometres 
a year. Bordoff and Noel (2008) likened it to a restaurant with an unlimited food policy for a fixed charge per person 
which encourages people eating more. Respectively, current insurance pricing policy encourages driving more 
kilometres annually, does not punish aggressive driving behaviour and on the other hand, it does not encourage 
prudent driving behaviour. But above all, this implies increased number of accidents, congestion conditions, carbon 
emissions, local pollution and oil dependence. Current pricing system is unfair because it literally forces drivers with 
low mileage per year and safer driving behaviour to subsidize the insurance costs for drivers who drive more 
annually and more dangerously. It has to be noted that research so far indicates that people with lower income drive 
fewer kilometres. 
In general, each driver could be assigned a probability of accident involvement based on his driving behaviour. 
Charging all drivers a lump sum, conceptually leads to assume that the accident probability is equal across the entire 
population of drivers. Evidently, this does not from a user optimum and socially equitable approach, as drivers with 
lower accident risk are forced to “subsidize” those with higher. In other words, safer drivers are forced to “buy” 
higher probability of accident risk than actually exists, unlike dangerous drivers who “buy” less. 
An innovative insurance policy could have a significant effect on safety depending on its design (Zantema et al. 
2008). This can be accomplished by differentiating premiums to reflect safety, more specifically charging higher 
fees for unsafe road categories and night-time driving, most effectively and apply it to all drivers. The insurance 
policy based on vehicle use (Usage Based Insurance or otherwise UBI) includes Pay-As-You-Drive Systems 
(PAUD) and Pay-How-You-Drive (PHUD). PAUD system is charging premiums based on total exposure 
characteristics such as mileage and road network used while PHUD is based on individual driving behaviour 
measuring parameters such as speed, harsh acceleration, hard braking etc. The main data source for the 
aforementioned parameters are the automotive diagnostic systems, OBD (On-Board Diagnostics), installed in the 
vehicle and/or the Smartphone held by drivers, sending all necessary information in a central database via mobile 
network. 
The main advantages of UBI schemes compared to the conventional solution offered so far are (Sugarman 1994, 
Litman 2004): 
x Each user will pay as and how he drives, not based on other unfair characteristics such as age, type of car, etc., 
which do not necessarily reflect the chance of being involved in an accident. 
x The need for cross-subsidies (cross-subsidies phenomenon) will be lower and result in a lower and more 
affordable cost of insurance premiums which would lead to a smaller number of uninsured vehicles. 
x This method itself is an incentive for users to improve their driving performance and consequently reduce the 
number of accident in which someone causes or gets involved in. It also enables someone to monitor his 
behaviour while driving thus eliminating behaviours that increase the likelihood of causing an accident. 
x The implementation of this approach will help reduce the total number of accidents leading ultimately to 
significantly upgraded road safety. 
x With regards to the social benefits, this method will assist driving behaviour improvement and thus reduce 
pollutants emission, saturation, energy consumption and will generally upgrade transportation system. 
An additional benefit offered by UBI schemes is user's feedback on driving behaviour by receiving statistical 
reports, after or while driving, such as the percentage of speeding, number of harsh acceleration/braking events, time 
driving during risky hours, fuel consumption etc. (Toledo et al. 2008). In this way, UBI may also serve as 
a mechanism to raise drivers’ awareness and change (improve) their driving behaviour. First, because the economic 
incentive will be strong for him. The premiums will be very high especially for dangerous drivers so the motivation 
to drive safer will be very powerful. The same would apply to safe drivers as well since premiums cost will be 
reduced because of their good performance. Second, the ability to monitor and compare their own performance from 
now onwards will assist towards their performance improvement. It is generally shown that (Birrell et al. 2014) an 
in-vehicle smart driving system, e.g. a smartphone application pointing out frequent mistakes a driver makes while 
driving, which is developed and designed based on drivers’ requirements information can lead to significant 
improvements in driving behaviours. 
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A study in the Netherlands showed that if PAYD were to be implemented, total crash reduction could be reduced 
more than 5% leading to 60 less fatalities as well as 1000 less injured each year in the Netherlands (Zantema et al. 
2008). Research in other countries outside Europe on differentiating premiums indicates the same percentage of 5% 
mileage reduction on average although driving during low and medium risk hours was only significantly reduced 
(Reese and Pash, 2009). 
The insurance market was at the starting point of 4.5 million subscribers in 2013, mainly from the United 
Kingdom, Italy and the US, between 1 billion insured vehicles worldwide. This number is expected to exceed 
160 million by 2020 showing that UBI is a very promising sort of insurance. As a result, it is an innovative 
insurance policy expected to be rapidly adopted worldwide in the future. 
Therefore, the future direction is to gradually replace the current homogenized insurance pricing policy with 
a fairly personalized pricing. As stated above, the development of technology and overcoming impediments that 
could not be overtaken before make this feasible. 
2. Driver exposure and behaviour data collection 
Until recently, the high cost of real-time driving data recording systems, data programs, cloud computing 
services, the inability to accumulate and exploit massive data bases (Big Data) for transport and traffic management 
purposes (De Romph 2013, Lee2014), as well as the low penetration rate of Smartphones and social networks, made 
it extremely hard to collect and manage real-time data and, therefore, to study the relation between driving 
behaviour and exposure and the probability of accident involvement. Research has indicated that barriers like the 
ones mentioned above can be overcome when consumers are given an incentive such as a monetary prize (Reese and 
Pash, 2009). 
Thus, the main challenge road safety entities and policy-makers are facing at the moment is the wide provision of 
information on the social benefits that could arise from an implementation of such a policy. As a matter of fact, high 
level of interest has been observed among users who were given a medium value financial incentive of $88 per 
6-months period to reduce their mileage. Consumers stated that lower Insurance premiums is among the strongest 
incentive for them and that a mileage-based Insurance could probably lead them to ultimately consider car sharing 
or even using public transportation (Reese and Pash, 2009). 
Nowadays, it is feasible to collect high quality real-time data in an efficient way in order to model individual and 
total traffic risk. In terms of the data collection process, data in most studies are recorded either by the vehicle’s 
OBD or user’s smartphone and transmitted to a central database for central processing and analysis (Boquete et al. 
2010, Iqbal and Lim, 2006). This allows the development of special indicators for estimating driver’s risk exposure 
(PAYD) and behaviour (PHYD). 
In some studies, there exists an on board platform inside the vehicle which acquires and processes data obtained 
from the GPS, the EOBD system and a mobile-telephone use detection circuit (Boquete et al. 2010). Data are 
transmitted to a control centre (CC) via a mobile telephone connection, where the risk reflected by each vehicle to 
the insurance company is estimated. The system uses mobile telephony connection to transmit data between the On-
-board system (OS) and the CC. Vehicle function data (such as number of seatbelts fastened) are captured from the 
EOBD system, vehicle position-speed data from the GPS and driver mobile-telephone use data from a detector 
circuit (RF energy scavenging) are ultimately acquired by the OS. Before transmitting it to the CC, data captured by 
the OS are processed and stored by a high-performance microcontroller that exists inside the core of the OS. 
Other studies also incorporate light or weather sensors that interact via a communications channel (infrared or 
Bluetooth) with the on-board computing unit reporting a numerical value (Iqbal and Lim, 2006). Position, speed and 
time are continuously recorded by the GPS receiver and transmitted to the central computing unit. 
Finally, Barmpounakis et al. (2016) conclude that, since a few technological obstacles that exist nowadays are 
overtaken, these systems can also be exploited for real time traffic monitoring. Other methods include extraction of 
vehicular trajectories from video recordings using a trajectory extraction system to collect vehicle traffic data 
(Barmpounakis et al., 2015). Although this is also not available for real time traffic monitoring it is very likely to be 
used for this purpose in the near future. 
As shown in Table 1, the method of data transmission to the Control Centre varies and is usually based on the 
telematics manufacturer. Other transmission methods are via a USB cable connecting the OBD and the CC, via 
a GPRS/CDMA network, wirelessly from a Bluetooth device built-in the OBD or through a microSD card. The 
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installation cost was also found to be moderate whereas the monthly/yearly fees also varied from a zero cost to $19 
a month after the first year of installation. 
Table 1. Manufacturers providing Telematic recording devices of driving characteristics. 
Manufacturer Data recorded: 
distance, speed, time 
Method of transmission Installation cost Monthly/yearly fee 
CarChipFleetPro  Distance, time, acceleration, 
speed, GPS location, fuel, Engine 
speed 
USB cable/port (customer 
loaded) 
$149 (plus a $395 charge for 
software, one per fleet) Can 
also be used wirelessly with 
a $200 base unit 
None 
Sky-meter time, distance, place, speed, 
acceleration of all driving, and 
the location and time of all 
parking 
GPRS/CDMA (other 
protocols available at extra 
charge) 
$50–$250 activation fee $5 per month plus 
5%–8% of monthly 
premium (depending 
on volume) 
OnStar Distance, speed, time, (incl. other 
features) 
Automatic through GPS S First year free for new GM 
cars (only available 
for GM) 
$18.95 per month 
after one year 
Freematics Speed, distance, time, location, 
acceleration, engine RPM 
Built-in Bluetooth Low 
Energy and SPP module for 
wireless data 
communication or via 
microSD card (32GB) 
99$ (Plus $30 for GPS 
module, plus $10 for MEMS 
MPU-9150 (9-axis) module, 
plus $10 for DUO BLE-BT 
2.1 and plus 5$ for 32GB 
microSD) 
None 
Progressive 
(MyRate Device) 
Distance, speed, time, location, 
acceleration, trip frequency 
Wirelessly None but $75 fee if not timely 
returned at end of policy 
Varies 
3. Driver exposure and behaviour risk indicators 
The indicators that are recorded by each device refer to exposure and behavioural characteristics, such as 
distance, time, location and speed, acceleration/deceleration, seatbelt use (www.skymetercorp.com, 
www.carchip.com etc.). There are a few manufacturers that measure additional information, such as the location and 
parking duration (www.skymetercorp.com). This information is then processed, based on rating information 
provided by the insurer, to generate the risk factors of interest for each driver. 
Some insurers so far are charging for driving per minute or mile (or km) travelled, or modify charges based on 
driver’s driving record, vehicle type owned, the class of road, time of the day driving, the riskiness of the historical 
behaviour or the riskiness of the current behaviour. Some others also charge for parking (www.skymetercorp.com) 
per hour parked at high risk locations (e.g., on street, in mall) but this is beyond the scope of this research. 
Generally, the main driving indicators mostly used so far in literature for calculating the driving risk of an 
individual are shown below in Table 2: 
Table 2. Risk indicators classification. 
PAYD PHYD 
Total distance driven by the user (the higher the mileage the higher 
the risk) 
Speeding expressed either as a percentage of kilometres/time driving 
over the speed limit or a percentage of speeding 
Road network type (increased accident frequency in the cities, 
increased accident severity outside) 
Harsh braking/acceleration 
Risky hours driving (increased accident frequency during a particular 
hours range). 
Driver’s accident history (severity of accidents, the circumstances of 
the accident) 
Trip frequency (a driver is more likely to cause an accident during an 
infrequent trip) 
Seatbelt use 
Vehicle type Mobile phone use 
The PHYD concept is not thoroughly examined and much less implemented. Nevertheless it should be 
highlighted that only a handful of studies have included behavioural characteristics in their models. So far, there is 
only one insurance company exploiting behavioural information to assess drivers and estimate their charges 
(https://www.progressive.com/auto/snapshot/). 
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Even on a research level, there exist many indicators both behavioural (harsh cornering, alcohol use, Ecological 
driving etc.) and exposure (vehicle maintenance condition, safety rating of the vehicle from the IIHS (Insurance 
Institute for Highway Safety)) that also affect traffic risk but are not incorporated in risk modelling until now. For 
instance, eco-driving is a factor considered to be significantly related to accident risk (Haworth and Symmons, 
2001). If fuel consumption according to the manufacturer's specifications is compared to the real consumption, 
conclusions can be drawn about how a user is driving (aggressive driving, speeding etc.). Moreover, the 
simultaneous existence of two driving characteristics, such as speeding during risky hours or braking harshly in an 
urban network may affect accident risk excessively. All the above should be further investigated to conclude on their 
significance to crash risk modelling. 
However, it should be mentioned that some of these indicators e.g. alcohol use cannot be easily taken into 
account yet in driving behaviour models as they cannot be captured efficiently. Nevertheless, it is very likely for 
scientists to be able to monitor these factors in an easy and reliable manner in the near future. 
4. Exposure-based Insurance (PAYD) 
Few studies focus on the correlation of vehicle-kilometres travelled to the hazards of traffic and therefore the 
determination of likelihood of a driver being involved in an accident. In the primary form of PAYD, mileage as an 
exposure characteristic was only incorporated in the models. This was derived from the fact that mileage and 
accident risk are close related. Indeed, there are many studies (Litman 2005, Bordoff and Noel 2008) that indicate 
a relationship between the reduction of VMT (vehicle miles travelled) and the reduction of crash risk. For example, 
Edlin (2003) finds that the elasticity of the number of accidents occurring with respect to VMT is approximately 1.7 
which means that if mileage was reduced by 10%, accidents would be reduced by 17%. Other researchers have 
found the elasticity of accident risk to be around 1.2 (ICBC Research Services Data, 1998). More specifically the 
authors claim that the 1981–1982 recession led to a 10% VMT and 12% insurance claims reduction in British 
Columbia. In support of the above, Ferreira and Minikel (2010) found that there is a high statistical significance 
between mileage and risk and that they are positively correlated. 
Many researchers on the other hand, focused on the type of relationship between mileage and accidents with 
a number of them indicating that there are serious grounds to believe that it is neither linear nor proportional for an 
individual vehicle (Janke 1991, Litman 2008). Consequently, the number of accidents divided by the number of 
mileage driven for a group of users should not be expected to remain constant. Ferreira and Minikel (2010) conclude 
that the relationship between risk and mileage is less – than – proportional when all vehicles are considered together 
with class or territory differentiation and less – than – linear when these factors are not taken into consideration. 
It was also found that most groups of lower mileage drivers (such as young and older drivers) tend to have higher 
crash rates compared to higher mileage drivers (Janke 1991), Langford et al. 2013). As a general fact, per mile 
crashes tend to decrease as annual mileage increases which is attributed (Litman 2008) to several factors such as that 
low mileage drivers are usually driving more miles in congested urban areas where traffic risk is higher, lack of 
driving practice etc. 
Based on the above it is clear why first studies concentrated on developing models that take into account mileage 
as the most (and sometimes the only) influential factor for traffic risk, the mostly used of which are described below. 
It should be mentioned that the risk prediction increases, when mileage is incorporated along with other rating 
factors in the model and not alone (Litman 1997, Ferreira and Minikel 2010). It is shown that mileage provides 
a great explanatory power, when combined with space and behavioural information of the miles driven (Ferreira and 
Minikel, 2010). It is, thus, a powerful supplement to traditional insurance rating factors (e.g. experience and 
territory). This would increase fairness among motorists even more as not all drivers would be expected to pay 
a flat-rate premium per mile but it would be differentiated based on other driving characteristics as well. 
Moreover, it has been found that, when annual mileage is taken into consideration, the influence of variables sex 
and education for accident prediction is minimized (Lourens et al. 1999). On the other hand, a well-documented age 
influence (young drivers’ age group) is proved and a strong positive correlation between traffic violation 
commitment and accident involvement (which is independent of the annual mileage driven) is seen in literature 
(Rajalin 1994, Massie et al. 1997, Lourens et al. 1999). 
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4.1. Pay-at-the-Pump (PATP) 
Other studies in the past presented the Pay-at-the-Pump (PATP) method which was the early stage of the 
mileage-based insurance policy that appeared later. Considering that fuel consumption and mileage are somehow 
correlated these two methods share many similar characteristics and the same basis. Wenzel (1995) argued why 
insurance premiums should be estimated based on use. Claiming that VMT is a good predictor of accident costs, he 
proposed an exposure-based system which was actually a per-gallon surcharge for consumers, a method similar to 
the PATP method. Wenzel also suggested that premiums should be the sum of a fixed amount based on location, 
vehicle safety characteristics and driving record, most of which are exposure characteristics, plus a variable amount 
based on fuel consumption (per-gallon surcharge). 
In other forms of PATP (Sugarman, 1994), the foundation of a governmental or county organization is introduced 
that will collect the funds at the pump in the form of fuel surcharges. Sugarman suggested that apart from the fuel 
surcharge, additional charges should be imposed based on drivers’ driving record and experience as well as on 
vehicle ownership. The latter amount was proposed to be defrayed either as a once-off fee or as an annual 
instalment. It should be highlighted that this method would substitute lawsuit system or tort liability only for bodily 
injuries and not for material damages. The author concludes that this new system will provide fairer funding, greater 
safety and better compensation for most users. On top of the benefits presented above by Litman (2004), Sugarman 
(1994) claimed that the new vehicle injury plan (VIP) would assist in overcoming many problems that appear in 
today’s insurance policy such as the fact that a large percentage of premiums goes to claims administration, 
duplicate other sources of compensation, for pain and suffering awards or is lost to fraud, the enormous number of 
seriously injured victims that are vastly undercompensated,, the unsatisfying claims process the long payment delays 
of many bodily injury claims and finally the fact that safer driving and safer vehicles are insufficiently encouraged. 
Khazzoom (2000) calculated the marginal exposure risk of the average driver to be around 2c/mile and suggested 
that the fuel surcharge could be set to 50c/gallon. He also argued for PATP over VMT-based insurance stating that 
the latter does not remove uninsured motorists from the road or encourage them to switch to more fuel efficient 
vehicles burdening this way the environment as well as it does not have any implementation problems. 
Generally, research indicates that PATP results to welfare benefits with both a direct and an indirect manner 
(Kavalec and Woods 1999, Khazzoom 1999, Khazzoom 2000). An average driver can be benefitted either 
individually by paying lower insurance premiums and have enhanced road safety or indirectly by societal benefits 
such as reduced external costs such as reduced energy consumption, congestion, greenhouse gases, emissions etc. 
However, due to the drawbacks of the PATP method referred below, PATP was not extensively implemented. 
Kavalec and Woods (1999) claimed that introducing a surcharge for gasoline is an incentive for consumers to drive 
vehicles that are more energy efficient in order to reduce their exposure to tax and not reduce their annual mileage 
significantly. Khazzoom (2000) raised the issue that differences in vehicle fuel efficiency are probably leading to 
a discrepancy between drivers which is nevertheless fairer than today’s lump sum policy. According to the author, 
PATP might also cause a slight shift to energy efficient vehicles, a fact that will increase the above mentioned 
discrepancy. Previously (Khazzoom, 1999), criticism against PATP was classified into two categories i.e. criticism 
of PATP design such as state bureaucracy, uncertainty of insurers’ income and long-distance motorists penalization 
and the consequences of adopting this new method such as the burden on lower income insurers and the shift to fuel 
efficient vehicles. 
4.2. Mileage-based Insurance 
Because of the drawbacks of the PATP method, efforts were focused on distance-based methods that are directly 
“penalizing” driving. For example, Weaver (1970) examined the potential of paying premiums proportionally to 
vehicle use (pay-as-you-drive – PAYD) as a possible solution for the economic asymmetry that currently exists in 
the vehicle insurance market. Survey results indicated that the new insurance method would reduce transaction 
costs, lead to more cost-efficient consumer behaviour, reduce premiums and benefit insurance companies, allowing 
them to create policies that better represent actual risk corresponding to each consumer. Other social benefits of 
PAYD insurance were also examined as well as the obstacles to the development of such a policy is likely to result 
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from the implementation of such a program such as reducing GHG emissions and CO2, dependence on oil, lowest 
number of accidents, the reduced need for maintenance of the infrastructure etc.  
Bordoff and Noel (2008) developed and evaluated a mileage-based model (PAYD) resulting that each household 
can reduce up to $ 270 per vehicle insurance contributions to be paid. The authors pointed out that if users were 
charged per kilometre, they would have an extra incentive to drive less, which would result in accidents reduction. 
They also consider that the reduction of vehicle would be around 8%, a figure which is equivalent to $ 50–60 
million due to reduced harmful effects on driving. The above reduction would also reduce carbon dioxide emissions 
by 2% and oil consumption by about 4%. Nichols and Kockelman (2014) showed that the average vehicle will be 
driven less by 2.7% (237 mileage reduction per year), with benefits for average consumers only $ 2.00 per vehicle 
with a premium that is partly fixed and partly based on mileage. Drivers with lower vehicle kilometres per year are 
expected to receive the greatest social benefits, thanks to the convex relationship between vehicle mileage and 
accident probability. This analysis supports the findings of the existing literature, namely that the PAYD policy can 
reduce vehicle kilometres travelled annually and leads to a fairer premiums system. 
5. Behaviour-based Insurance (PHYD) 
Current Pay As You Drive systems are said to have many weaknesses and shortcomings, because they are 
focused only on the number of driven kilometres and not on driving behaviour (Kantor and Stárek, 2014). 
Evaluating how a user is driving is most times more crucial to accident risk estimation than counting how much he 
is being driving. Modelling the driving pattern of each driver efficiently is a matter of significant importance for 
crash risk modelling, as it gives the opportunity not only to sufficiently understand differences between driving 
behaviours but take them into consideration as well. 
Most researchers used a linear modelling approach to model PHYD insurance (Iqbal and Lim 2006, Boquete et 
al. 2010). For instance, Boquete et al. (2010) implemented a UBI model that takes into account driving behaviour 
attributes. The on-board system was installed in vehicles and data were transmitted using mobile data service to the 
control Centre. The basic concept was to build a premium cost model based on how much (mileage), where (Zones 
used), when (Day/night) and how (overspeeding, harsh accelerations, number of vehicle passengers, mobile phone 
use) a vehicle is driven. Premiums were calculated as a sum of a fixed charge imposed to each driver plus a linear 
combination of the above mentioned indicators and their coefficients. In other recent studies (Iqbal and Lim (2006)) 
driving behavioural attributes are also included in cost calculation and apart from exposure characteristics such as 
weather and light conditions risk, rush hour risk and road network risk terms, they also incorporate speeding risk 
terms which stands for the percentage of driving over the speed limit after detecting the road network type the driver 
is using. Premium cost in this study was computed as the product of a base rate for each driver by all risk factors 
calculated for each indicator (road network type, overspeeding etc.) (Iqbal and Lim 2006). 
On the other hand, there have been studies where the alternative method proposed is a fuzzy-linguistic 
approximation apparatus which according to the authors is a suitable tool taking into consideration the insufficient 
exact knowledge and the large possible combinations of the parameters used as model’s input (Kantor and Stárek, 
2014). A comprehensive algorithmic procedure successfully integrated the process of the driving pattern assessment 
and a projection of that evaluation into the insurance premium was produced. The algorithm consisted of six 
algorithmic steps namely data collection, meteorological conditions evaluation, vehicle dynamic qualities 
determination, manoeuvre type determination, manoeuvre style evaluation and finally number of penalty points 
assignment and determination of driving style sanctions. As for the types of manoeuvres, driving straight, turning, 
overtaking, speeding, aggressive deceleration, non-fluent driving (frequent acceleration and deceleration) were taken 
into account but the manoeuvre style is being evaluated for driving straight, turning, overtaking and aggressive 
braking. Finally, the parameters used as input for the fuzzy model were visibility, deteriorated road conditions, 
sufficient vehicle performance, acceleration in x and y axes, speeding, motorways and roads (directions separated or 
not separated). 
According to performed research on PHYD schemes so far, this new method presents many potentials and 
appears to have many benefits. However, although PHYD is undoubtedly the best way to rate a user’s driving and 
estimate his crash risk, it still remains a sharp shift from today’s lump sum policy; an alteration that probably needs 
some effort in order to be adopted by society. Moreover, PAYD methodologies implemented so far seems to be very 
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persistent and unilateral as to the parameters considered. With regards to exposure-based modelling, mileage is not 
the only factor influencing traffic risk and therefore multivariate exposure-based insurance models should be 
developed taking into account parameters such as the road network used, time-of-the-day driving etc. (on the top of 
mileage driven). 
6. Issues to consider  
The aim of studying UBI is the development of a premium calculation system based on the exposure and/or the 
behavioural characteristics during driving and ultimately to create reliable models able to associate driving risk with 
driving exposure (for PAYD models) and/or driving behaviour (for PHYD models) and charge road users based on 
that risk. PAYD premium calculation method is based only on driving exposure characteristics. Risk is only 
correlated with vehicle’s exposure, assuming that the probability of an accident occurrence increases as some 
indicators referred below, such as driven kilometres, increase. Traditional insurance approach does not consider the 
exposure of a vehicle or the behaviour of a user and assigns to a specific vehicle and driver an “average premium” 
that corresponds to the “average driver” and consequently to an “average accident probability”. On the other hand, 
PHYD is based on users driving behaviour evaluation and degree of exposure leading to a realistic estimation of the 
corresponding risk. The PHYD model incorporates a large number of parameters allowing the accurate estimation of 
the driving risk. The final outcome of the PHYD model can be an individual risk indicator that will depict the risk 
associated with the driving behaviour of a user. Since premium calculation in PHUD is based on the evaluation of 
driving behaviour of the user, it leads to a more realistic assessment of the risk than PAYD approach does. 
It is evident that the PAYD model is a more simplistic approach using fewer parameters as risk indicators. 
However, it has also significant advantages since (a) it is easier to implement (b) the period for the development and 
the verification of the model is significantly smaller, as less data are required and, also, significant information may 
be found in literature and reports of relevant organizations (c) it is targeted to the vehicles that are not often used. On 
the other hand, PHYD is a more sophisticated approach aiming to (a) associate the driving risk with a large number 
of indicators quantifying – in a realistic manner – the driving behaviour (b) raise driving awareness and motivate the 
driver to evaluate and improve their own driving behaviour and (c) increase the profit of the Insurance Companies 
via this self-improvement of the drivers. 
Ranking insurance pricing schemes based on how well marginal vehicle costs are represented by different fees 
(Litman 1999), models taking into account time and location information (PHYD) were the best performing, 
followed by mileage-based models (PAYD), PATP models (PAYD), fixed vehicle charges models (current 
insurance policy) and external costs (not charged to drivers) models respectively. 
Finally, as shown above, although the contribution of past research on PAYD pricing is important, only a small 
percentage to date has dealt with PHUD systems. As previously mentioned, this method objectively calculates 
traffic risk since it takes into account several important factors such as sudden braking/acceleration, driving over the 
speed limits, etc. which makes it a more reliable tool for calculating the probability of accident involvement. This is 
where future research should mainly focus on as well as on developing and evaluating PAYD and PHYD models 
and compare their efficiency. 
In terms of the indicators exploited so far in PAYD/PHYD literature, it should be mentioned that there are a few 
such as alcohol use, vehicle maintenance condition, vehicle safety rating etc. that affect accident risk and are not yet 
included in UBI modelling. Furthermore, the effect of two different driving characteristics such as harsh 
acceleration on a highway should also be examined. Although some of these factors cannot be currently monitored 
in an easy and reliable manner, most of these can or will be able to be efficiently captured in the near future. 
The above literature review reveals a trend in PAYD related literature which are mainly focusing on the effects, 
externalities and potentials that UBI offers. Although the potential that arises from the implementation of PAYD 
schemes both on insurance companies and drivers has been examined thoroughly (Husnjak et al. 2015), PAYD 
appears not to be exhaustively modelled till now. 
7. Discussion 
This paper constitutes a systematic effort to gather, group and present the most scientifically strong studies in 
literature relevant to PAYD and PHYD methodologies. Unlike the past, there is an obvious trend for motorized 
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insurance to become even more personalized. This means that instead of calculating insurance premiums based only 
on demographic characteristics such as age, number of years holding a driving licence etc., personal driving 
characteristics either exposure and/or behavioural are slowly incorporated into insurance models. 
As seen from the above literature review there has been an extensive effort of analysis and evaluation of PAYD 
methods. The small extent of implementation thus far has demonstrated that it has a great influence on all levels, 
economic, social, environmental, etc. This is a ground-breaking first attempt to change the established insurance 
billing system that is currently anachronistic and unfair to many users and also proved not to contribute in any way 
in accident reduction which is the goal of road safety. 
In the future, a gradual global transition towards PAYD/PHYD insurance could be envisaged. Low-risk drivers 
(low-mileage, safer drivers etc.) will receive gain many incentives to opt out of traditional insurance in favour of 
alternative insurance policies such as mileage-based insurance (Parry 2004); this is becoming increasingly feasible 
as telematics systems are gradually incorporated in newer vehicles. Governments are also likely to encourage this 
trend in the future through policies and political decisions such as subsidies, tax waivers for insurance companies 
offering alternative policies like these. 
Annual crash risk can be calculated as the product of per-mile crash risk times annual mileage (Litman, 2008). 
Although imposing drivers to reduce their annual mileage would probably lead to reduced traffic risk, two factors 
are not taken into consideration. Firstly, a driver that is penalized based only on mileage is not incentivized at all for 
improving his driving behaviour. Therefore, per-mile risk remains an unspecified factor which can fluctuate over 
time. This means that despite the fact that mileage is reducing, total crash risk can still be increased. Secondly, 
insurance system still remains unfair and the cross-subsidies phenomenon is not eliminated since per-mile crash risk 
is considered to be the same for all drivers and is not individually calculated. Consequently, behavioural aspects of 
driving should be incorporated in insurance models in order to contribute towards current trends of personalized 
vehicle insurance. 
In support of the above, even if it is assumed that per-mile crash risk remains constant, while annual mileage is 
reducing throughout the year, total individual crash risk reduction cannot be calculated since it depends on other 
behavioural characteristics that are not currently recorded and therefore not taken into consideration in today’s 
usage-based insurance. Driving information such as number of harsh brakings and accelerations, percentage of 
overspeeding, road network category etc. should be included in driver’s evaluation so as a per-mile risk factor could 
be assigned to each individual driver. In other words, risk factor is risk’s increase rate which indicates how total 
individual risk is increased as mileage raises. Calculating this factor is the only way to accurately predict individual 
crash risk and consequently, fairly charge each driver based on the risk he reflects. Since technological solutions can 
be given nowadays and conditions to efficiently record and manage real-time big data are finally met, science should 
move towards that direction. 
From a road safety perspective, eliminating the cross-subsidies phenomenon would award good drivers for 
driving safely. It would also provide a strong motivation for risky drivers to improve their driving behaviour and 
reduce their degree of exposure by being charged higher insurance premiums and receiving feedback and 
monitoring their driving performance and exposure. As a result, an insurance model incorporating individual driving 
characteristics would enhance safety by reducing traffic risk both totally and individually, since it would provide 
drivers with both positive and negative incentives to decrease their exposure and improve their behaviour. 
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